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We mathematize El Farol bar problem and transform it into a workable model. In general, the
average convergence to optimality at the collective level is trivial and does not even require any
intelligence on the side of agents. Secondly, specializing to a particular ensemble of continuous
strategies yields a model similar to the Minority Game. Statistical physics of disordered systems
allows us to derive a complete understanding of the complex behavior of this model, on the basis of
its phase diagram.
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INTRODUCTION
Statistical mechanics has developed powerful tools to
tackle analytically disordered systems with many degrees
of freedom. These tools were recently shown to be appli-
cable to systems of inductive heterogeneous agents such
as the Minority Game [1, 2, 3, 4]. Even if the latter is
inspired by El Farol’s bar problem [5], the literature on
these two models are rather separate. In particular what
the MG has brought to the understanding of the El Farol
problem as defined by Arthur is not clear. Here we show
that all results known about the MG directly apply to
the El Farol problem.
In the El Farol’s bar problem, N = 100 customers
have to decide independently whether to go or not to the
bar, which has a capacity of L = 60 seats, the resource
level. Attending when the bar is crowded is not enjoy-
able. Customers are inductive rational agents. They use
simple predictor rules, based on the past attendances,
to predict whether the bar will be crowded or not, and
behave accordingly.
One important issue is whether the customers, that do
not communicate with each other, are able to synchronize
their actions so that the attendance A is on average equal
to the resource level L. The main result of Arthur is that
agents need not be endowed by a sophisticated deduc-
tive rationality in order to synchronize. Even inductively
rational agents can do. This results is probably respon-
sible for the large interest his model aroused [6]. Here
we show that even inductive rationality is not necessary
because even zero-intelligence agents, acting as simple
automaton, are able to self-organize to the comfort level.
The convergence of the average attendance to the com-
fort level L is trivial under very generic and reasonable
conditions. The really non-trivial question is whether
agents are able or not to reduce stochastic fluctuations
of the attendance A around L. The Minority Game was
introduced [1] exactly to address this question, though
in a simplified model. In what follows, by focusing on
a particular ensemble of strategies for the El Farol bar
customers, we derive a model for which we can use all
the machinery used in the theory of Minority Games to
derive a complete picture of the El Farol bar problem.
The main results are that there is an optimal com-
plexity of the strategies which agents should consider,
depending on their number N . More precisely, for a
fixed ratio ℓ = L/N of seats to agents, coordination
is optimal when agents use predictor strategies based
on m ≈ αc log2N values of the past attendance. If
m ≪ αc log2N crowd effects occur whereas when m ≫
αc log2N the information on past attendance is way too
redundant.
We also show the importance for the agents to use con-
sistent predictors. On the one hand, a small systematic
bias affects considerably the results. On the other, an El
Farol problem with consistent strategies is equivalent to
a Minority Game. This implies that a large part of liter-
ature on the latter model is also directly relevant to the
study of the former without any modification. Inconsis-
tent strategies correspond to biased strategies, or equiv-
alently to a tunable resource level, in Minority Games.
Such issues were investigated numerically in Refs. [7, 8, 9]
with numerical simulations.
A MATHEMATICAL FORMALISM FOR EL
FAROL BAR PROBLEM
In Arthur’s paper, each customer uses the public
knowledge of past m weeks’ attendance
It = {A(t−m), A(t−m− 1), · · · , A(t− 1)}
2in order to determine whether to go the the bar, or to
stay at home. She crafts a prediction of the next atten-
dance A(t). If her prediction is larger than the resource
level, she stays at home, else she goes to the bar. The
learning procedure is inductive: she has a personal set
of S fixed strategies based on S different attendance pre-
dictors Ai,1, · · · ,Ai,S . These are functions mapping the
information I about the past m attendances to the in-
teger prediction Ai,s(I) ∈ [0, N ] of the next attendance
A(t).
Each attendance predictor Ai,s s = 1, · · · , S should
not be rewarded depending on their precision but rather
on the payoff they give to an agent who follows their
advice. So if A(t) = 59, a prediction of 5 is better that a
prediction of 61. More precisely, every predictor s has a
score Ui,s associated to it, that evolves according to
Ui,s(t+ 1) = Ui,s(t) + Θ{[Ai,s(It)− L][A(t)− L]},
where Θ(x) is the Heaviside function [Θ(x) = 0 for x < 0
and Θ(x) = 1 for x ≥ 0],
A(t) =
N∑
i=1
ai(t),
is the attendance at time t and ai(t) is the choice of
customer i at time t, which is determined by following
her best predictor at that time. Mathematically,
si(t) = argmax
s′
Ui,s′(t)
and
ai(t) = Θ[L−Ai,si(t)(It)].
This is the setup of the game proposed by Arthur [19].
He did not specify what the predictor space was, but gave
only a few examples of predictors, such as the average of
the last attendance numbers A(It) = 1/m
∑m
t′=1A(t −
t′), or a mirror number of the attendance of t − 3, i.e.,
A(It) = L−A(t−3). Fogel et al [10] used auto-regressive
functions A(It) =
∑m
k=1 fkA(t − k), where fk are real
numbers.
Specifying the ensemble of predictors from which
agents draw strategies is a key issue in the El Farol bar
problem.
Predictors and strategies
In general, a predictor is a function from I ∈ [0, N ]m
to A ∈ [0, N ]. There are (N + 1)(N+1)m different such
functions. A strategy instead, is a function a(I) from the
set of possible informations I ∈ [0, N ]m to an action a ∈
{0, 1}. Each strategy can be be considered as the result
of the prescription of a predictor: a(It) = Θ[L−A(It)].
However, simple counting shows that there are
2(N+1)
M
possible strategies, which is way smaller than
the number of predictors for large N . Hence many dif-
ferent predictors A(I) correspond to the same strategy
a(It). For a particular strategy a(I) with
∑
I
a(I) = K,
there are
N (a) = (N − L)KL(N+1)M−K (1)
predictors A which are consistent with that strategy.
Eq. (1) implies that not all strategies are equivalent, in
principle. In order to illustrate this point, let us consider
the case of a strategy resulting from a predictor taken
at random. When N,L ≫ 1, we almost surely pick a
strategy which prescribes to go a fraction L/(N + 1) of
times. Indeed by Eq. (1), almost all strategies have this
property.
As a byproduct we see that Arthur’s result that the
attendance self-organizes to the comfort level L is trivial
if agents draw predictors uniformly and at random from
the whole predictor space. The attendance self-organizes
to the comfort level L for the simple reason that agents
following predictor strategies will attend with a proba-
bility L/(N + 1).
Actually it is desirable to restrict the ensemble of
predictors from which agents draw, to those having
some consistency and continuity properties. Consistency
means that the predictor should be consistent with past
observations: for example if A(t − k) fluctuates around
some value L a consistent predictor would also have A ≈
L. A predictor of the Fogel type A(I) =∑Mk=1 fkA(t−k)
should be such that
∑M
k=1 fk = 1, else it would predicts
systematically an attendance which is larger than the
true one, hence, not be consistent.
A minimal requirement of consistency is that the re-
sulting strategies be unbiased, i.e. that “on average”
they prescribe to attend a fraction L/(N + 1) of the
times. A mathematical formalization of this property
entails non-trivial considerations and it will not be pur-
sued here[20]. Rather we shall later introduce explicitly
the bias of strategies as an external parameter and study
the collective behavior as a function of it.
Strategies derived from a random predictor, are un-
biased but fail to have a minimal degree of “continu-
ity”. Loosely speaking, continuity of A means that if
the change in the information I is small, the change in
the prediction A(I), or at least in the prescribed action
Θ[L − A(I)] should also be small (or rare). For exam-
ple, the action prescribed by the strategy should change
only rarely when the attendance of a past day changes by
a small amount. Considering that past attendance may
also be subject to observation errors, continuity is a quite
desirable robustness property of strategies.
3A workable model
In the following we focus on a particular ensemble of
strategies, which is obtained by reducing the information
space. The intuition is that what is really telling about
the value of a past attendance A(t − k) is whether that
was below or above the comfort level L, which is a binary
information. In other words we consider strategies
aµs,i = Θ[L−As,i(I)] (2)
which depend only on the information
µ(t) = {Θ[L−A(t− 1)], . . . ,Θ[L−A(t−m)]}. (3)
Clearly strategies derived in this way have a high degree
of continuity.
Not all strategies derived by a predictor aIs,i = Θ[L −
As,i(I)] are of the form described above. There are only
22
M
strategies of this type, which means that a reduction
of the information space also implies a strong reduction
of the strategy space [21].
The fact that agents use a strategy space whose size is
independent of N makes much sense. In context where
agents interact with a crowd, their behavior is insensitive
to the exact size N of the population.
Henceforth we assume that each agent is assigned S
strategies randomly drawn from this pool. More pre-
cisely, for each i, s and µ we draw aµs,i independently from
the distribution
P (a) ≡ Prob{aµs,i = a} = a¯δ(a− 1) + (1− a¯)δ(a).
As explained above, the induced strategy space of the
El Farol problem is such that on average, agents attend
the bar with a frequency L/N . In other words, binary
strategies of the El Farol bar problem account a priori
for the convergence of the attendance to L on average.
Hence we shall consider below an ensemble of strategies
such that the average of aµs,i is a¯ ≈ L/N . Actually we
shall see that small deviations of a¯ from L/N may have
a large effect in the limit N →∞.
A further simplification, which does not change the
qualitative nature of the results [11] amounts to consider
a linear dynamics of the strategy scores
Ui,s(t+ 1) = Ui,s(t)− (2aµ(t)i,s − 1)[A(t)− L]. (4)
Note that the strategies that predict the correct choice
are rewarded whereas those prescribing a wrong choice
are punished.
The understanding of the behavior of this model is
made complex by the feedback of the fluctuations of A(t)
with the dynamics of information µ(t). Notice that Eq.
FIG. 1: Behavior of the average attendance (top) and of the
fluctuations (bottom) in the El Farol bar problem with L = 60
seats, a¯ = 1/2 and m = 2, 3 and 6 from left to right. In
both cases, the solid (dotted) line refers to true (random)
information.
(3) is equivalent to assuming that µ(t) follows the non-
linear dynamics
µ(t+ 1) = |2µ(t) + Θ[L−A(t)]|2m (5)
where | . . . |P is the modulus P operation. The behavior
of the Minority Game is largely unaffected if this dy-
namics is replaced by a random draw of µ(t) [12, 13]. As
we shall see this is not the case in our case. Still it is
very helpful to introduce a variation of the model with
random information, where µ(t) is just randomly drawn,
with uniform probability, from the integers 1, . . . , P = 2m
(if the history is random, P can be any integer number).
This is because the model with random information can
be understood in detail within a theory such as that de-
veloped for the MG. This is a quite useful intermediate
step toward understanding the behavior of the El Farol
bar problem with true information. In addition it is also
possible to quantify the effects of the dynamics of true
information Eq. (5) along the lines of Ref. [12].
In order to illustrate the behavior of the model, Fig.
1 shows the results of simulations with L = 60, a¯ = 1/2
and m = 2, 3, 6 (from left to right) fixed as a function of
N . This shows what happens in a system where the “en-
vironment” (L) and the adaptive capabilities of agents
(a¯ and m) are kept fixed, while the number N of agents
increases. The top graph shows the deviation 〈A〉 −L of
the average attendance from the comfort level. As we see
when Na¯ ≈ L the attendance converges to the comfort
level 〈A〉 ≈ L. However, for small m there is a whole
interval around Na¯ = L where agents are still able to
coordinate efficiently 〈A〉 ≈ L. For m = 2, the results
are qualitatively the same with true and random infor-
mation. For larger values of m the region where 〈A〉 ≈ L
4shrinks. In addition, while 〈A〉 maintains a monotonic
behavior with random information, it develops a maxi-
mum and minimum for intermediate values of a¯N/L be-
yond which the behavior with true information markedly
departs from that with random information.
It is important to quantify the model’s behavior also
beyond the properties of 〈A〉. Indeed, we have seen that
convergence to the comfort level is a trivial result in the
limit N → ∞. It is a built-in property of the model
which arises from the requirement of unbiased strategies
(a¯ ≈ L/N).
The non-trivial cooperative behavior of this system,
as forcefully remarked by the literature on the Minority
Game, lies in how and whether agents manage to decrease
fluctuations of the attendance A(t) around the comfort
level L. Indeed even if A(t) equals L on average, the dis-
tance |A(t)−L|measures the amount of wasted resources,
either unexploited A(t) < L or over-exploited A(t) > L.
Therefore, the quality of the cooperation among agents
is measured, at a finer level, by the fluctuations around
the resource level, defined as
σ2 = 〈(A− L)2〉 (6)
where 〈. . .〉 is the average on the stationary state. Given
that A(t) is the sum of N contributions, it is natural to
study the quantity σ2/N which, as we shall see has a
finite limit value in the limit N →∞.
The behavior of σ2/N is shown in Fig. 1. Away from
the point a¯N = L, the increase of σ2/N is mainly due to
the deviation 〈A〉−L and as before, it differs in the cases
of true and random information. For small m, σ2/N dis-
plays a maximum at a¯N = L which becomes shallower as
m increases and it disappears for m = 6. This non-trivial
behavior suggests that a small bias in the strategies, of
either sign, is beneficial as it decreases the fluctuations
(see also [8]).
This is evident from Fig. 2, where we compute the
fraction 〈|A− L|〉/N of unsatisfied agents and compare
it with the behavior of agents who attend the bar at ran-
dom, either with probability a¯ or with probability L/N .
Here we clearly see that in the region a¯N ≈ L adaptive
agents behave less efficiently than random agents. This
effect is related to the emergence of fluctuations and is
stronger for small values of m. Efficiency increases for
larger values of m.
We shall devote the rest of this paper to explain
the non-trivial behavior displayed by 〈A〉 and σ2. The
first step will be extending the analytic approach of
Refs. [3, 11] to the model with random information,
which is essentially equivalent to a Minority Games with
biased strategies and tunable resource level. Then we
shall analyze the case with true information.
FIG. 2: Fraction of losers in the El Farol bar problem with
L = 60 seats, a¯ = 1/2 and m = 2 for random (⋄) and true (•)
information. The results for a population of random agents
who attend the bar independently with probability a¯ and L/N
is also shown for comparison (dashed and dotted lines).
STATISTICAL MECHANICS OF THE EL FAROL
BAR PROBLEM WITH RANDOM
INFORMATION
Following Ref [11], one deduces that agent i ends up
playing strategy s with frequency fi,s that minimizes the
quantity
H =
P∑
ν=1
ρν(〈A|ν〉 − L)2
where ρν = Prob{µ(t) = ν} = 1/P and
〈A|ν〉 =
N∑
i=1
S∑
si=1
fs,ia
ν
s,i
is the average of A(t) conditional on the event µ(t) = ν.
This result can be obtained in a straightforward manner
by taking the average of Eq. (4) in the stationary state,
and comparing the resulting equations with the first or-
der conditions of the minimization of H with respect to
fs,i.
The function H measures the predictability in the sys-
tem, i.e. the amount of useful information about the
fluctuations of the attendance which is left in the signal
µ(t). Indeed if e.g. 〈A|ν〉 6= L, the signal µ(t) carries in-
formation which is useful to predict whether one should
attend or not to the bar when µ(t) = ν. The fact that the
stationary state corresponds to minimal H means that
agents exploit to their best the system’s predictability.
In terms of statistical mechanics, H can be considered
as a Hamiltonian and its minima can be studied with
standard methods. As long as H > 0, the stationary
state is unique, and the replica trick [14] gives exact re-
5on the S = 2 case (see Ref. [15] for a generalization to
S > 2). The details of the calculus are of no special
interest, as they mostly replicate previously published
calculations [3].
We shall consider the thermodynamic limit N → ∞
with
ℓ ≡ L
N
and α =
P
N
fixed [16]. Furthermore, in order to study the effect of
a deviation of a¯ around ℓ we introduce the convenient
parameter γ with the equation:
a¯ = ℓ+
√
ℓ(1− ℓ)
P
γ (7)
and we shall consider γ finite in the limit N →∞. As we
shall see this is a non-trivial limit. For example, the case
where a¯− ℓ ≈ O(1) is finite, is trivial because then each
agent uses just one strategy, that which prescribes to go
more (less) often if a¯ < ℓ (a¯ > ℓ) and there is no dynamics
at all. Eq. (7) implies that we consider small deviation of
a¯ = ℓ+O(1/
√
N) from the correct value ℓ = L/N . Even
such a small deviation, which vanishes as N → ∞, has
a finite effect on the global behavior as we shall see. At
any rate, other limits can be obtained analyzing the cases
where either ℓ, α or γ vanish or diverge, in the analysis
that follows.
After some routine calculations, we find that the pre-
dictability H/N is given by
H = N
√
ℓ(1− ℓ)
2
1 +Q(ζ) + 2γ2/α
[1 + χ(ζ)]2
(8)
and the fluctuations, as long as the stationary state is
unique (see later), are equal to
σ2 = H +N
√
ℓ(1− ℓ)
2
[1−Q(ζ)] +NΣ. (9)
In these two equations, Q and χ are given by
Q(ζ) = 1−
√
2
π
e−ζ
2/2
ζ
−
(
1− 1
ζ2
)
erf
(
ζ√
2
)
χ(ζ) =
[
α
erf (ζ/
√
2)
− 1
]−1
(10)
whereas the parameter ζ is uniquely determined by the
transcendental equation
α
ζ2
−Q(ζ)− 1− 2γ
2
α
= 0 (11)
as a function of α and γ. Finally Σ in Eq. (9) is a
term which arises from collective fluctuations and its cal-
culation requires, in principle, a detailed theory of the
FIG. 3: Phase diagram of the El Farol bar problem. The
dashed lines correspond to the trajectories of systems with
L = 60, a¯ = 1/2 and m = 2, . . . , 6 as the number of agents
increases (from bottom to top). The dot-dashed line corre-
sponds to a typical trajectory of a system with fixed L, N
and a¯ > L/N as the agents’ memory changes.
stochastic dynamics of the model (see Ref. [11]) which
we shall not pursue here, but whose importance is dis-
cussed below.
When γ = 0, these equations are identical to those
which describe the MG behavior. We briefly recall the
resulting picture: When α is large, the system is in an in-
formation rich phase with positive predictability H > 0.
The predictability H decreases as α decreases. This can
be understood by observing that, at fixed P = 2M , a
decrease in α means that the number of agents increases,
and hence their ability to exploit the information. At
a critical value αc = 0.3374 . . . the predictability van-
ishes and a phase transition to a symmetric phase with
H = 0 takes place. The fact that H measures an asym-
metry in the signal means that the phase transition is
related to symmetry breaking [12]. The phase transition
is signaled by the divergence of the spin susceptibility χ,
which is infinite in the whole symmetric phase. The sta-
tionary state is unique, independent of initial conditions,
for α > αc and these facts conspire [11] in such a way
that Σ ∼= 0 for α > αc. On the contrary, for α < αc, the
stationary state is not unique but it depends on the initial
conditions. Then Σ > 0 can be computed within a very
accurate self-consistent approximation [11]. In particular
this shows that Σ ∝ 1/α for small α.
Therefore, the El Farol bar problem, with the strategy
ensemble studied here, and the MG have the same behav-
ior of fluctuations when γ = 0, that is, when Na¯ = L.
When γ 6= 0 the picture changes in the following way:
First we observe that all quantities depend on γ2, then
it is enough to consider only the case γ > 0 since all
conclusions extend directly to the case γ < 0. When
γ is small, we still have a phase transition at the point
6αc(γ) = erf(ζc/
√
2) where χ → ∞. The parameter ζc is
the solution of
erf (ζ/
√
2)
ζ2
−Q(ζ)− 1− 2γ
2
erf (ζ/
√
2)
= 0 (12)
Figure 3 plots the phase diagram of the game. The criti-
cal line separates the asymmetric phase (H > 0) from
the symmetric phase (H = 0). It crosses γ = 0 at
αc(0) = 0.3374 . . ., the critical point of the standard
MG [3, 4]; when γ increases αc decreases and αc = 0
for γ ≥ 1/√π.
The meaning of the phase diagram is clear: Indeed
H = 0 implies 〈A〉 = L. The symmetric phase is the
region of parameters where the average attendance con-
verges to the comfort level. This region is also character-
ized by large collective fluctuations σ2 and by a depen-
dence on initial conditions; in particular, the fluctuations
decrease if the difference of strategy a priori valuation in-
creases as discussed in the MG literature [4, 11, 17, 18].
On the contrary, there is no equality between 〈A〉 and L
in the asymmetric phase if γ > 0.
These results explains the complex behavior reported
in Fig. 1. Indeed as N varies with L, a¯ and m fixed,
the system follows the trajectories shown in Fig. 3. For
small values of m these cross the symmetric phase in the
region a¯N ≈ L. Fig. 4 indeed shows that H computed
along these trajectories fully agrees with the theoretical
results (for random information). The symmetric phase
is characterized by large fluctuations, mainly due to dy-
namic fluctuations (the term Σ). This explains the non-
monotonic behavior of σ2 in Fig. 1 for small values of m.
When m increases, the trajectory in Fig. 3 moves toward
larger values of α and, for m > mc, it remains all in the
asymmetric phase. Then Σ = 0, which means that σ2
displays a single minimum at a¯N = L (i.e. γ = 0).
In spite of the fact that the theory is derived in a par-
ticular N →∞ limit, our results show that it reproduces
accurately results for moderately small values of N . At
the same time, it clearly predicts how the collective be-
havior depends on the parameters N, L, a¯ and m. Any
“experiment” where one of these parameters is changed,
corresponds to a precise trajectory in the (α, γ) phase
diagram and a corresponding collective behavior. For
example, for fixed m and ℓ = L/N , anomalous fluctua-
tions will arise in an interval of size 1/
√
P = 2−m/2 as
a¯ changes around ℓ along a vertical trajectory in Fig. 3.
The memory size controls fluctuations. Indeed generally,
as P increases, keeping all other parameters fixed, the
systems moves away from the symmetric phase (see dot-
dashed line in Fig. 3).
It is precisely at the boundary of the two phases that
coordination is most efficient. This means that there is
an intermediate memory length which is optimal for the
collective behavior.
FIG. 4: H/N in the El Farol bar problem with true infor-
mation and L = 60, a¯ = 1/2 and m = 2, 3, 4 and 6 as a
function of N . Theoretical results (full lines) fully agree with
numerical simulations (symbols).
FIG. 5: Entropy Sm/m of the El Farol bar problem with true
information and L = 60, a¯ = 1/2 and m = 2, 3, 4 and 6 as a
function of N . Vertical lines delimit the symmetric phase of
the corresponding model with random information.
TRUE INFORMATION
The behavior of the model with true information devi-
ates from that with random information because, under
the dynamics Eq. (5), the space of informations is not
sampled uniformly. More precisely, if ρµ is the probabil-
ity of information µ in the stationary state, we can make
this statement quantitative introducing the entropy
Sm = −
2m∑
µ=1
ρµ log2 ρ
µ.
When the space of information is sampled uniformly ρµ =
1/2m we find Sm = m, whereas Sm = 0 when only one
7value of µ is sampled recursively. Fig. 5 shows that
Sm ≈ m only occurs in the region where H ≃ 0 in the
corresponding model with random information, i.e. in
the symmetric phase. This is consistent, because ifH = 0
then the process of Eq. (5) is a simple diffusion on the
so-called De Bruijn graph. We refer the interested reader
to Ref. [12] for a detailed account of this process. Here it
is sufficient to observe that if 〈A|µ〉 = L for all µ, then[22]
Prob{µ(t+ 1) = |2µ(t) + 1|2m} = 1
2
.
If this is the case, the stationary state probability ρµ =
1/2m is uniform [12]. When H > 0, for a particular value
of µ, we expect that L − A(t) will take more frequently
one sign or the other. Hence Eq. (5) will induce a biased
diffusion process on µ(t). In particular, for aN < L, the
attendance will be more often below the comfort level
than otherwise. This means that 1’s will occur more
often that 0’s in Eq. (3) for µ(t). It is easy to check that
a systematic bias of this type, produces a distribution ρµ
which is concentrated on µ = {111 . . .} (using the binary
representation). Likewise ρµ is peaked on µ = {000 . . .}
when aN > L [23].
Hence outside the symmetric phase, when H > 0, the
process µ(t) acquires a bias, which reduces the “effective
number of information patterns” to a number 2Sm . In
order to understand how this changes the collective be-
havior of players, imagine the extreme case Sm = 0 where
for some reason, the state µ(t) = {000 . . .} ≡ 0 occurs for
a large number of periods. Then agents will learn how to
respond optimally to this state µ = 0.
There are N++ = a¯
2N agents with a0i,1 = a
0
i,2 = 1.
They will go anyway. There are N−− = (1− a¯)2N agents
with a0i,1 = a
0
i,2 = 0 who will not go. The remaining
2a¯(1 − a¯)N can decide. Agents can learn to converge to
A(t) = L provided that N++ ≤ L ≤ N −N−−, i.e. if
L
1− (1− a¯)2 ≤ N ≤
L
a¯2
.
Furthermore, if N > L/a¯, in particular if it is close to
the upper limit L/a¯2, the information µ = 0 will arise
very frequently from the dynamics Eq. (5). The same
argument runs for N < L/a¯ and it shows agents can
coordinate quite efficiently when N is close to L/[1(1 −
a¯)2], because then the information µ = {111 . . .} will
almost always occur.
This complex interaction between the dynamics of A(t)
and µ(t) explains the non-monotonic behavior of 〈A〉−L
in Fig. 1.
CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a complete theory of the El Farol
bar problem. The key issue lies in the definition of the
strategy space. First we have shown that, for the most
general ensemble of strategies, convergence of the atten-
dance to the comfort level is a trivial consequence of the
law of large numbers. It does not even require inductive
rationality. Even zero-intelligent agents are able to reach
it. This is likely to be true for any reasonable predictor
based strategy, in particular for unbiased ones.
We further focus attention on a particular ensemble
of strategies, with a desirable continuity property. This
leads us to study models very similar to the Minority
game. We first introduce the random information ver-
sion of the game, for which statistical physics provides a
complete theoretical understanding and analyze the con-
sequences of the dynamics of true information.
It turns out that as the parameter of the El Farol bar
problem change, the system performs a trajectory on a
phase diagram characterized by a symmetric phase where
〈A〉 = L and a phase where 〈A〉 6= L. Deep in the sym-
metric phase, anomalous fluctuations similar to crowd
effects, develop making the coordination of agents even
worse than that of random agents in some cases. It is
precisely close to the phase boundary that agents manage
to coordinate most efficiently. This, however, requires a
small bias of either sign, in the strategies of agents.
These findings not only confirm that the El Farol bar
problem is indeed a quite interesting complex system.
But they also show that a coherent understanding of its
behavior is possible, using tools of statistical physics.
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